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“Omniscience, at least for one who is not himself omniscient, is 
merely an opinion.”
Nathan Katz, Buddhist /mages of Human Perfection, p. 255.
(King Pasenadi speaking to 3akyamuni):
“I asked the Lord about omniscience and he explained omniscience 
to me in a manner which pleases, satisfies and gladdens me.”
Lord Chalmers, trans., Further Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. 2, p. 70.
Omniscience in the Indian context
The concept of omniscience has a long history in Indian thought.1 
The Vedas themselves do not contain the word “omniscience,” but at 
several points they refer to similar concepts. The god of fire, Agni, is 
one of the most popular figures addressed in the Vedic hymns, and a 
common epithet for him is “JQtavedas,” which means “knowing all 
created beings.” However, the Vedas exhibit a characteristic known as 
kathenotheism, which consists of the tendency to address various 
different gods each as supreme. There are a bewildering variety of gods 
addressed in the Vedic hymns, but no one of them is clearly pre-emi­
nent. Instead, depending upon which god the particular hymn is ad­
dressed to, that god will be lauded with a collection of superlatives, 
which are addressed to a different god in another hymn. Thus high 
honors for knowledge are not exclusive to Agni by any means. Varuna, 
known as “chief of the gods of the natural and moral order,” is 
1 Best references are found in Ram Jee Singh, The Concept of Omniscience in An­
cient Hindu Thought.
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supplicated saying: “According to his wisdom Varuna knoweth all.” In 
another passage we find: “Prajapati! thou only comprehendest all 
these created things, and none beside thee.” With the development of 
the Upanisads we are on firmer ground, for here the Sanskrit word for 
“omniscience” does appear.2 The general tendency of the Upanisads is 
to equate omniscience with knowledge of the atman or soul, though 
there is still ascription of omniscience to the god Vi$nu, for example. 
The movement from the Vedas to the Upanisads thus presents a change 
in the concept of omniscience. What used to be reserved for the gods is 
now accessible to certain people as well, those who seek the atman. Yet 
knowledge of the atman is not what we normally take the word “omnis­
cience” to mean. This indicates that omniscience has several different 
meanings within Indian philosophy and religion, of which the literal or 
common meaning, of knowing everything, is perhaps the least in­
teresting. We may compare “omniscience” to “omnivorous,” in­
dicating that the latter certainly does not mean that one has already 
eaten everything, but rather that one is prepared to eat anything that is 
edible, which excludes a large number of things. Analogously, omnis­
cience may be regarded as a potential rather than a fait accompli, the 
ability to know everything that is knowable, without having already 
known it all. And the limitation of this kind of omniscience to that 
which is knowable is an important distinction, since it would exclude 
all future events at least, as well as a large proportion of past events. 
This kind of omniscience we may call a figurative or metaphorical om­
niscience, as opposed to the more common literal omniscience. The 
kind of omniscience that is referred to in the Upanisads as synonymous 
with knowledge of the atman may be designated a spiritual omnis­
cience, since in knowing the atman as identical with the fundamental 
nature of reality, one knows an underlying feature of all seemingly 
separate phenomena. These various different kinds of omniscience ap­
pear within the Buddhist tradition as well.
2 The word in Sanskrit is sarvajna, sarva meaning “all, or everything” and jiia the 
regular verbal root, cognate with our English “to know.”
Omniscience in Pali sources
Contemporaneous with the development of the Upanisads there ap­
pear in India several different religious teachers who deny the efficacy 
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of the Vedas entirely. The most important of these figures for our pur­
poses are Sakyamuni Buddha and Mahavira, who founded the religious 
traditions of Buddhism and Jainism. Jaina religious eschatology main­
tained that the soul had an innate capacity for knowledge, which was 
obscured by layers of karma, or accumulated sinful actions. Through 
religious practice, largely consisting of austerities, these layers could be 
burned off, and once they were all gone, the soul would be liberated. 
Having removed all obstacles to the soul’s cognition, it would naturally 
follow that the soul would be omniscient. The Jains called this 
knowledge of the liberated soul kevala-jnOna, and their insistence upon 
the reality of this attainment forms one of the hallmarks of Jaina doc­
trine.3 This is consistent both with Jaina sources themselves and with 
reports of Jaina doctrines in the Pali scriptures. We find Abhaya the 
Licchavi saying in the Anguttara Nikaycr. “Sir, Natha’s son, the 
Unclothed, claims to be all-knowing, all-seeing, and to have all-com- 
prising knowledge and vision. He says, ‘Whether I walk or stand or 
sleep or wake, my knowledge and vision are always and without a 
break present before me.* ” Similarly in the Majjhima NikOya: “When 
this had been said, monks, these Jains spoke to me thus: ‘Your 
reverence, Nataputta the Jain is all-knowing, all-seeing; he claims all- 
embracing knowledge-and-vision, saying: “Whether I am walking or 
standing still or asleep or awake, knowledge-and-vision is permanently 
and continuously before me.” ’ ” Finally, the CQla-Sakuludayi-Sutta 
contains the following less than complimentary passage in which 
Udayin addresses fSakyamuni:
3 P. S. Jaini, The Jaina Path of Purification, p. 260: “Absolute omniscience is in 
their tradition the fundamental criterion for liberation.” Also, K. N. Jayatilleke, Eu/Ty 
Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 204, quoting Jacobi's Jaina Sutras, says that omnis­
cience was “one of the fundamental dogmas of the Jains.”
“Some time ago, revered sir, one who was all-knowing, all- 
seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vision, said: 
‘Whether I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, 
knowledge-and-vision is constantly and perpetually before 
me.’ He, on being asked a question by me concerning the 
past, shelved the question by (asking) another, answered off 
the point and evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness . . . 
[Buddha inquires:] ‘But who was this, Udayin, that all-know­
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ing, all-seeing, claiming all-embracing knowledge-and-vi- 
sion ... on being asked a question by you . . . evinced temper 
and ill-will and sulkiness?’ [Udiyin replies:] ‘Revered sir, it 
was Nataputta the Jain.”
There are other similar passages in the Pali suttas, but to ensure that 
the Buddhists are not misrepresenting this position of the Jainas, we 
may turn to their own sources, where we find: “the Jaina view of omnis­
cience . . . may be now defined as an immediate and direct knowledge 
of all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and 
remote, far and near, by a single ever-lasting act of knowledge requir­
ing no assistance from the senses and even mind.”4 Jaini also discusses 
the nature of Jaina omniscience in this way: “Such knowledge is com­
pared to a mirror in which every one of the innumerable existents, in all 
its qualities and modes, is simultaneously reflected. These ‘knowables’ 
are cognized without any volition whatsoever on the part of the arhat. 
Furthermore, no activity of the senses or mind is involved; there is only 
direct perception by the soul.”5 So this Jaina omniscience would seem 
to be a literal kind of omniscience, which outside of the Jaina tradition 
is usually reserved for deities. It is an automatic kind of knowledge, re­
quiring “no volition” and “no activity of the senses or mind.” In fact, 
“omniscient cognition and sensory cognition are held to be mutually 
antithetical.”6 This follows from the Jaina conception of the soul, 
which is an innately knowing entity. Having removed all obscurations, 
this innate feature of the soul will manifest itself completely, without 
any possible hindrance or limitation. So crucial is this doctrine of om­
niscience to the Jaina tradition that it is used to validate all other Jaina 
teachings. Jaini writes that “the authority of the Jaina teachings rests 
ultimately on the fact that they were preached by an omniscient be­
ing,”7 which seems very similar to the idea of revelation as a source for 
religious teaching.
4 Ram Jec Singh, The Jaina Concept of Omniscience, p. 18.
5 Jaini, op. cit., p. 266.
4 ibid., pp. 34-35.
7 ibid., p. 89.
The Buddhist tradition from its inception has also made use of the 
concept of omniscience, but in a very different manner. In the tradi­
tional account of 3&kyamuni’s enlightenment, the content of his 
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realization is said to consist of three kinds of knowledge: of his own 
previous existences, clairvoyance which sees the transmigration of be­
ings in accordance with their karma, and destruction of the teravas, 
which are said to consist of sensual desire, desire for existence, and ig­
norance. Having attained enlightenment, Sakyamuni decided to teach 
others how to achieve the same realization after being requested by 
Bramha, one of the main deities in the Hindu pantheon. Learning that 
his own former teachers were dead, he decided to give his first teaching 
to the group of five monks with whom he had previously engaged in 
various ascetic practices. While on his way to meet them, he encountered 
an ascetic named Upaka. Upaka noticed that Sakyamuni didn’t look 
like an ordinary fellow, so he asked him,
“ ‘Who is your teacher, or whose dhamma do you profess?’ 
When this had been said, I, monks, addressed Upaka, the 
Naked Ascetic, in verses:
‘Victorious over all, omniscient am I.’ ”8
8 I. B. Horner, trans., The Middle Length Sayings, Ko/. /, p. 214. Also E. Thomas 
The Life of Buddha as Legend and History, p. S3.
9 Thomas, p. 83. Also Horner, p. 215.
That is to say, on the basis of the previously mentioned three kinds of 
knowledge, Sakyamuni here claims omniscience for himself. This is ob­
viously not meant as a literal omniscience, but as a more spiritual kind 
such as in the Up an is ads. What is most remarkable about this passage, 
though, is Upaka’s reaction to Sakyamuni’s grand pronouncement: 
“Thereupon Upaka said, ‘Would that it might be so, friend,’ shook his 
head, and went off on a by-path.”9 That is to say, Upaka exhibits a 
thoroughly skeptical attitude to Sakyamuni’s claim to omniscience, 
and goes off unconvinced. This reaction seems a very natural one to us, 
and the fact that it portrays Sakyamuni in such an uncomplimentary 
way directly after his enlightenment is probably good evidence for its 
authenticity. No later redactor would be likely to make up such a story. 
Even though Upaka recognizes that something about Sakyamuni is 
special, he does not become “the first Buddhist.” The connection be­
tween the three kinds of knowledge and omniscience is also mentioned 
in the Tevijja-Vacchagotta Sutta, where Sakyamuni meets the 
wanderer Vacchagotta, who says that he has heard Sakyamuni 
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described as omniscient, in the manner of the Jaina saints. Responding to 
this report, 3akyamuni replies that he has three knowledges: he can 
recall his past lives, he is clairvoyant, and he has become liberated by 
destroying the “cankers.” These of course are the same three that con­
stituted his enlightenment. Responding to Abhaya the Licchavi’s state­
ment above, Ananda makes no mention of omniscience, but simply 
tells him about the basic Buddhist triad of sTla, samadhi, and prajnO as 
constituting the Buddhist path to nirvana. On another occasion, when 
Sakyamuni is addressing Sandaka, he parodies the Jaina idea in this 
way:
“As to this, Sandaka, some teacher, all-knowing, all-seeing, 
claims all-embracing knowledge-and-vision, saying: ‘Wheth­
er I am walking or standing still or asleep or awake, knowl­
edge-and-vision is constantly and perpetually before me.’ He 
enters an empty place, and he does not obtain alms food, 
and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, 
and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce 
bullock, and he asks a woman and a man their name and clan, 
and he asks the name of a village or a market town and the 
way . . . Whereupon, Sandaka, an intelligent person . . . 
goes away uninterested.”10
10 I. B. Horner, trans., The Middle Length Sayings, Vol. 2, p. 199.
That is to say, someone who was truly omniscient would not act in such 
a way, and if he claims to be omniscient yet acts in the manner de­
scribed above, it is difficult to take his claim seriously. In general, we 
find that $akyamuni seems to be uninterested in claims of omniscience, 
partly because they are notoriously difficult to verify, but largely 
because they are not helpful for one who seeks liberation. Continuing 
his talk to Sandaka quoted above, Sakyamuni distinguishes four types 
of unsatisfactory bases for religious teaching. The first is the example 
just given, of a teacher who claims to be omniscient. Second is a 
teacher who follows tradition. Third is a teacher who follows reason, 
and last is a teacher who is stupid and confused. Although the context 
suggests that the first type was primarily directed at the Jainas, the 
principle itself is expressed without reference to any specific figure, and 
we know from other sources that Mahavira was not alone in claiming 
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to possess omniscience. At one point in the Maha-Parinibbana-Sutta, 
Sariputta addresses the Buddha thus: “Lord! such faith have I in the 
Exalted One, that methinks there never has been, nor will there be, nor 
is there now any other, whether wanderer or brahmin, who is greater 
and wiser than the Exalted One, that is to say, as regards the higher 
wisdom.” This is quite a natural expression of Sariputta’s admiration 
for Sakyamuni, but Sakyamuni takes him to task for it, inquiring 
whether or not Sariputta has personally known the minds of all other 
sages of the past, present, and future. Sariputta has to admit that he 
has not, that he has in fact been speaking beyond his own experience. 
For Sariputta to meaningfully praise $akyamuni as being omniscient 
would necessitate that Sariputta also be omniscient to verify Sakya- 
muni’s realization. For Sakyamuni one of the root causes of human 
confusion and suffering is that people tend to speak beyond their 
own experience, and it is for this reason that he rebukes Sariputta for 
speaking in such a way. This rational and critical attitude of Sakya- 
muni is what many people find attractive in the Pali scriptures. It is 
certainly a far cry from such statements as Tertullian’s famous “I 
believe because it is absurd.” Sakyamuni considers that faith which is 
not based on sound reasoning and personal experience is a hindrance 
to spiritual realization. This anti-dogmatic attitude is exemplified in the 
famous goldsmith quote: “Just as wise men (test a claim to be gold) by 
burning, cutting and rubbing (on a touchstone), my statements, O 
monks, should be accepted after examination and not out of respect 
for me.”11 That this attitude is still illustrative of the best of the Bud­
dhist tradition is demonstrated in a recent quote from the Dalai Lama: 
“If there’s good, strong evidence from science that such and such is the 
case, and this is contrary to Buddhism, then we will change.”12
11 Jayatilleke, p. 391, notes that “this verse is not found in the Nikayas but it reflects 
the attitude of the Buddha as often represented in the Nikayas.”
12 In the New York Times, October 8, 1989, Section 4, p. 6.
It would be nice if we could leave the Pali literature at this point, and 
simply report that £akyamuni displayed a consistently critical attitude 
towards claims of omniscience, whether they were made about other 
teachers or addressed to himself, preferring to limit his own claims to 
the three kinds of knowledge we have mentioned. However, there are 
some further passages which render such an interpretation untenable.
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Chief among these is a passage in the Kannakatthala Sulla, which is 
worth quoting in exlenso:
“Then King Pasenadi spoke thus to the Lord: T have heard 
this about you, revered sir: “The recluse Gotama speaks thus: 
There is neither a recluse nor a brahmin who, all-knowing, 
all-seeing, can claim all-embracing knowledge-and-vision— 
this situation does not exist.” Revered sir, those who speak 
thus ... I hope that these, revered sir, speak what was spoken 
by the Lord, that they do not misrepresent the Lord by what 
is not fact, that they explain dhamma according to dhamma, 
and that no reasoned thesis gives occasion for contempt?’ 
‘Those, sire, who speak thus ... do not speak as I spoke 
but are misrepresenting me with what is not true, with what is 
not fact.’. . .
Then King Pasenadi spoke thus to the Lord: ‘Could it be, 
revered sir, that people might have transferred to quite 
another topic something (originally) said by the Lord in 
reference to something else? In regard to what, revered sir, 
does the Lord claim to have spoken the words?’
‘I, sire, claim to have spoken the words thus: There is 
neither a recluse not a brahman who at one and the same time 
can know all, can see all—this situation does not exist.* ”
Here Sakyamuni makes a distinction between two different kinds of 
omniscience: one which is realized “constantly and perpetually,” and 
the other which is more like a potential than a fully realized condition. 
In our typology, this is a figurative or metaphorical omniscience, as the 
potential to know anything that can be known, without having actualiz­
ed that potential. Given the principle stated above, that 5akyamuni 
criticized all statements which go beyond personal experience, we are 
left with the conclusion that Sakyamuni in this passage was claiming 
the more limited form of omniscience for himself, albeit indirectly. 
The classic formulation of this kind of omniscience is to be found in 
the Milinda-panha, in which there are eight separate references to Bud­
dha’s omniscience.13 King Milinda asks: “ ‘Revered Nagasena, was the
” See Kawasaki Shinjd, “Omniscience in Pili Texts0 (in Japanese) in Buddhism 
and Its Relation to Other Religions, pp. 187-203, for a full discussion of all these 
passages.
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Buddha omniscient?’ [Nagasena replies] ‘Yes, sire, the Lord was omnis­
cient, but knowledge-and-vision was not constantly and continuously 
present to the Lord. The Lord’s omniscient knowledge was dependent 
on the adverting (of his mind); when he adverted it he knew whatever it 
pleased (him to know).’ ” Here Sakyamuni’s supposed omniscience is 
quite clearly defined as a potential capacity, dependent upon his inten­
tion or mental “adverting.”14 Nagasena goes on to compare Sakya- 
muni’s purified knowledge with a sharp arrow “fitted to a sturdy bow 
and shot by a strong man” which will easily penetrate any clothes 
made of linen, silk, or wool which are in its path.
14 The Pali word used is avajjana, which may also be translated as “concentration.” 
Jaini uses “reflection” in translating this same passage.
“As, sire, a man could put into one hand anything that had 
been in the other, could utter a speech through his open 
mouth, could swallow food that was in his mouth, opening 
his eyes could close them, or closing his eyes could open 
them, and could stretch out his bent arms or bend in his 
outstretched arms, sooner than this, sire, more quickly the 
Lord’s omniscient knowledge (could function), more quickly 
the adverting (of his mind); when he had adverted it, he knew 
whatever it pleased (him to know).”
Sakyamuni’s knowledge is of the same kind as ordinary knowledge, 
but simply heightened to the nth degree. If I want to think of my name, 
this requires very little effort on my part, due to extensive practice and 
familiarity. For $3kyamuni, all possible objects of knowledge are 
similarly familiar, and his mental training has honed his intellect to 
such a degree that no obstacles remain. Here again, we note that this 
concerns possible objects of knowledge, and not things which are 
unknowable by their very natures.
The Milinda-pahha is a fairly late text, and one can easily discern 
some Mahayana tendencies in its pages, but in this case it simply works 
out the implications of the Kannakatthala Sutta’s statement given 
above. While we have no sure way of dating the Pali literature or 
separating it into different strata, based on the doctrinal development 
we have noted, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the composition 
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of the Kannakatthala Sutta occurred at a later period than that of 
the other sources cited above. It is very possible that Sakyamuni’s 
disinterested attitude towards the issue of omniscience reflects his real 
feelings, and that later statements attributed to him where he appears 
to claim some form of omniscience for himself were interpolations 
created by disciples who felt uncomfortable comparing their teacher 
with Mahdvira, who had claimed a literal kind of omniscience all 
along. It seems that the idea of omniscience would never have become 
an issue in the Buddhist tradition (at least not at this early stage) if 
there had not been other forces at work, competing with Buddhist 
teachings. Under pressure from rival sects, loyal Buddhists desired that 
the figure of their own founder not be regarded as inferior, and so they 
naturally wished to praise him as extravagantly as possible, after the 
manner of Sariputta above. However, they were stuck with a pre-ex­
isting textual tradition wherein $akyamuni displays a critical attitude 
towards claims of omniscience made by his contemporaries, and so the 
compiler(s) of the Kannakatthala Sutta had to reinterpret the idea of 
omniscience itself in order to apply it to their revered founder. As we 
shall see, in so doing they initiated a controversy which was to continue 
for as long as there were Buddhists in India.
Transitional stages
At about the same time as the composition of the Milinda-pahha or 
shortly thereafter, the Buddhist tradition began to produce a new set of 
scriptures known collectively as the PrajhapQramita literature. These 
scriptures mark the inception of the movement that came to be known 
as Mahayana Buddhism, which spread from India through Tibet, 
central Asia, and China into Japan. The Prajhapdramita SQtras 
themselves come in various lengths, of which the version in 8000 lines is 
generally regarded as the oldest, dating from around the beginning of 
the Christian era. This scripture continues to use the same word, sarva- 
jha, to designate the Buddha’s omniscience, but the sense of this word 
has changed dramatically. For example:
“When one trains oneself on those stages, one trains 
oneself in Buddhahood, or the state of all-knowledge; and 
thereby in the immeasurable and incalculable Buddha-dhar- 
mas. Thereby one trains oneself neither for the increase of 
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form, feeling, etc., nor yet for their decrease; neither to ap­
propriate form, etc., nor to let them go. Nor does one train 
oneself to get hold of any other dharma, even of all­
knowledge, nor to produce one, or make one disappear. 
When he trains thus, a Bodhisattva trains in all-knowledge, 
and he shall go forth to all-knowledge.”
“It is because the Lord has trained himself in just this 
perfection of wisdom that the Tathagata has acquired and 
known full enlightenment or all-knowledge . . . this all­
knowledge of the Tathagata has come forth from the perfec­
tion of wisdom.”
“The perfection of wisdom, O Lord, is the accomplish­
ment of the cognition of the all-knowing. The perfection of 
wisdom is the state of all-knowledge.”
“Perfect wisdom is the source of the all-knowledge of the 
Buddhas.”
“All-knowledge is immeasurable and unlimited. What is 
immeasurable and unlimited, that is not form, or any other 
skandha. That is not attainment, or reunion, or getting there; 
not the path or its fruit; not cognition, or consciousness; not 
genesis, or destruction, or production, or passing away, or 
stopping, or development, or annihilation. It has not been 
made by anything, it has not come from anywhere, it does not 
go to anywhere, it does not stand in any place or spot. On the 
contrary, it comes to be styled ‘immeasurable, unlimited.’ 
From the immeasurableness of space is the immeasurableness 
of all-knowledge. But what is immeasurableness that does not 
lend itself to being fully known by anything, be it form, or 
any skandha, or any of the six perfections. Because form is 
all-knowledge, and so are the other skandhas, and the six 
perfections.”
I give such an extensive variety of quotes to demonstrate the problems 
faced by commentators on the PP scriptures. What is stated plainly in 
one place is contradicted in another, and any feeling of “Ah, now I 
understand,” does not last for very long. The frustrating obscurity of 
this text leads one to have sympathy for Poussin, who denounced “In­
dian 'philosophumena' concocted by ascetics . . . men exhausted by a 
38
BUDDHIST OMNISCIENCE
severe diet and often stupefied by the practice of ecstasy.”15 Conze 
himself, who probably was more familiar than any Westerner (and 
most Orientals) with this literature, says, “The Prajnap£ramit& sutras 
in turn fascinate and exasperate the student, in turn raise him to the 
very heights of elation, and then again reduce him to a condition of 
baffled helplessness.”16 However, we may venture to make a few ten­
tative observations, keeping in mind that whoever wrote the Pra- 
jnQpQramita scriptures would probably never agree with anything we 
try to say about them. The first point is linguistic, and is simply that the 
word here translated as “all-knowledge” is indeed sarvajnata, an 
abstract form of the same word used in the Pali literature for the omnis­
cience of Buddha and Mahavira. The Buddha here retains his faculty 
of omniscience, but both Buddha and omniscience are very different 
from what we found in the Pali sources. Furthermore, this seems to be 
omniscience in the secondary sense noted above, that is not a complete 
permanent knowledge of everything, but a knowledge of “perfect 
wisdom,” which is generally understood to imply a realization of emp­
tiness. This type of omniscience is thus not very different from the 
spiritual or Upanisadic type, where it is regarded as the culmination 
of intensive meditative analysis. The mere term “perfect wisdom,” 
considered in isolation, is not a bad gloss of the literal meaning of om­
niscience, but in a Buddhist context, and particularly in the Pra- 
jndpQramita scriptures, both these terms have very specific technical 
senses, which the later commentators develop.
15 Quoted in L. M. Joshi, Discerning the Buddha, p. 7.
16 Conze “On Omniscience and the Goal’’ in Middle Way, Vol. 22, No. 3, p. 63.
The other important version of the PrajfiQpOramita scriptures is the 
version in 25,000 lines, which is essentially an expanded version of the 
earlier one. Conze dates the only surviving complete Sanskrit version 
of this text to the 5th century, and considers it as a recast version of an 
earlier original. It has been reorganized with a view to bringing its con­
tents more in line with the sequence of the AbhisamayQlamkOra. It is in 
this text that we first encounter the three different kinds of omnis­
ciences which are explained by the AbhisamayalamkQra. SarvajHata is 
demoted from its position as the realization of the Buddha to that of 
Hinayana practitioners, while the Buddha’s omniscience is designated 
by a new term, sarvakOrajriatn, or overall omniscience. This is a rather 
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clumsy attempt to exalt the Buddha while denigrating Hmaydna, and 
the awkward English of “overall omniscience” as opposed to simply 
“omniscience” sounds just as strange in Sanskrit. Between these two is 
the bodhisattva, whose realization is called margajnatd. However the 
usage of these terms is not fully consistent in this text. In this text as 
well, omniscience (or overall omniscience) is generally synonymous 
with enlightenment or Buddhahood.
The best known commentator on the PrajnapQramitn Sutras is un­
doubtedly Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka philosophical 
school, whose writings on emptiness express the direct or explicit mean­
ing of the PrajnapUramita texts. Nagarjuna himself uses the term “om­
niscient” only once, to my knowledge, in his salutation verse at the 
beginning of his Ratnavail, but without any attempt to define its mean­
ing. Thus we have no clear idea of what “omniscience” means at this 
period in Buddhist history, although we can be fairly sure that it means 
neither what it meant before, for Nagasena and his predecessors, nor 
does it mean what it later comes to mean within Mahayana. The word 
itself remains the same, but its meaning is undergoing a transforma­
tion.
We should mention here that there is another work attributed to 
Nagarjuna and extant only in Chinese, the MahOprajnaparamitdpadefa- 
sastra (MPPS). There is mention of both sarvajna and sarvakQrajna in 
this work, but following Hikata we may presume that the presence of 
the latter, as well as any distinction between these two terms, is prob­
ably more properly attributed to Kumarajiva rather than Nagarjuna. 
Yet even in this text, although both terms are used, there is no clear 
distinction between them, with Buddha acclaimed as omniscient (sarva­
jna and/or sarvdkdrajna), while such an attainment is denied to 
Hlnayana practitioners. This text is probably earlier than the Pra- 
jndpUramitU Sutra in 25,000 Lines mentioned above.
Omniscience for Vasubandhu
Following this transitional phase, we next come to that landmark of 
Buddhist literature, the Abhidharma-kosa. Composed around the mid­
dle of the 4th century, this work represents the culmination of earlier 
Buddhist practices into a sophisticated philosophical system. Dating 
from after the start of the Mahayana, the Kosa is one of the last great 
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works of early Buddhism to be composed in India. Its author Vasuban- 
dhu has the distinction17 of being one of the only Buddhist authors to 
achieve renown in both branches of Buddhist philosophy, the earlier 
Hinayana as well as the later Mahayana. Within the Kofa itself, 
however, we find only scant references to the concept of omniscience, 
which here retains its early form as sarvajria. The discussions of omnis­
cience occur within the framework of sectarian disputations among the 
several groups (traditionally given as eighteen) which had arisen by this 
time, each with their own special ways of interpreting Buddhist doc­
trine.
17 Shared with Wittgenstein, whose own philosophical career embraces two distinct 
phases.
18 At least in the verses. In the commentary he often seems to side more with the 
SautrOntikas, as noted in S. Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, p. 17.
We start with an objection from a VOtsTputrTya standpoint. This sect 
held that there must be an underlying basis of continuity to the person, 
which they called the pudgala. This was regarded by most other sects as 
virtually identical to the Otman, and the VOtsTputrTya assertion of the 
pudgala was the object of repeated scorn and ridicule. In this context 
the VatsJputrTya claimed that the pudgala must have more than a momen­
tary existence in order for Buddha to know everything. A mere series 
of mental instants cannot possibly have such knowledge. Vasubandhu 
replied that Buddha's omniscience is to be considered as a potential 
rather than an actualized state, dependent upon his attention or voli­
tion. Vasubandhu cited the example of a fire, which cannot burn 
everything at once, but has the ability to burn everything sequentially. 
Since Buddha has the ability to know everything, he is acknowledged 
to be omniscient. Thus Buddha’s knowledge was regarded as having 
the same essential structure as the knowledge of ordinary people.
In opposition to this was the position of the MahOsamghikas, who 
held that Buddha’s knowledge was qualitatively different from that of 
ordinary people. In the view typical of other Hinayana schools, con­
sciousness existed moment by moment, flickering on and off like a 
movie. By the time a second moment arises, the first moment is com­
pletely gone. However, this made it difficult to establish causality 
operating over any space of time. The SarvastivOdins* whose views 
Vasubandhu generally upholds in the Xofa,18 asserted the existence of 
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more than one moment; indeed, they claimed that both past and future 
existed just as much as the present. Their view was, as outlined above, 
similar to that of the Milinda-panha, where Buddha’s omniscience, 
functioning in much the same way as ordinary knowledge, is dependent 
upon volition for its activity. It is not automatic. The Mahasdmghikas 
and others claimed that Buddha’s omniscience was automatic. It was 
not dependent upon volition or any other factor, but was simply a 
result of his extreme mental purity. This assertion seems quite similar 
to that of the early Jainas mentioned above. The Sarvastivddins main­
tained that Buddha’s omniscience occurred over a period of two in­
stants, one to cognize all phenomena and the other to render that cog­
nition accessible. Mahasamghikas rejected this, and said that since 
consciousness itself is self-luminous, there is no need of a second mo­
ment. This position was to become standard in later Mahayana discus­
sions of this topic, and of the nature of the mind in general.
As mentioned above, Vasubandhu’s career as a Buddhist philoso­
pher spans the division between HinaySna and Mahayana, and so we 
find further discussions of omniscience in his later works. Of particular 
interest in this connection is the Mahayana SUtralamkara (MSA), 
which along with the Abhisamay&lamkara (AA) belongs to what are 
known as the “five texts of Maitreya.” But when we examine the MSA, 
we find that its use of omniscience is quite different from that of the 
AA, which by itself would cast some serious doubt on the traditional 
ascription of these two texts to the same author. Let us proceed to the 
relevant textual citations. For the sake of analysis, we may divide them 
into two groups, first those that mention sarvajha (sj), and second 
those that mention sarvakarajha (saj). First we find Vasubandhu’s 
commentary on MSA 1. 15: “the path to omniscience [sjj is extremely 
difficult to penetrate.” Here is a typical Buddhist or Upanisadic view 
of omniscience as a metaphor for enlightenment. Next is MSA IX. 1-2: 
“After countless hundreds of ordeals, after countless harvests of 
births, and after countless destruction of blocks over immeasurable 
periods of time, omniscience [saj] is attained, unspoiled by (the 
slightest) block, like a casket of jewels thrown open, it is celebrated as 
Buddhahood.” And in the commentary: “Buddhahood is presented 
from the point of view of achievement, nature, and a simile ... Its 
nature is the attainment of omniscience [saj] unspoiled by any block.” 
Here again omniscience is explicitly identified with Buddhahood or 
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enlightenment, as the removal of all obstacles or blocks to knowledge. 
Although the word used is sarvakarajnatd, there is little to distinguish 
it from the previous sarvajna. For a final instance we may cite MSA 
XI. 2: “In brief, the Sutra, Vinaya, and Abhidharma have a fourfold 
etymology. When he knows them the sage obtains omniscience [saj].” 
And its commentary: “In brief, Sutra, Vinaya and Abhidharma are 
each fourfold in etymology; the bodhisattva who knows them obtains 
omniscience [sj].’’ Where the verse has sarvakOrajnatd, Vasubandhu ex­
plains this as sarvajnatd. This is the clearest evidence we have that he 
makes no significant distinction between these two key terms. And the 
meaning of omniscience is here reduced to a simple mastery of the tradi­
tional divisions of Buddhist literature. There are other quotes we could 
bring out here, but they would not affect the main point. The distinc­
tion at the heart of the AA between three different kinds of omnis­
cience is unknown to Vasubandhu (at least at the time when he wrote 
this MSA commentary), and seems to be ignored by whomever com­
posed the verses as well. The crucial middle term which links the sar­
vajna of the Hinayanists with the sarvakdrajna of the Buddha in the AA 
is the mdrgajna of the bodhisattvas, but this term does not occur even 
once in the MSA or Vasubandhu’s commentary. This is a strong indica­
tion that the AA system was not formulated by the same person who 
was responsible for the MSA, and renders the traditional ascription of 
both of these texts to Maitreya extremely dubious. The designation 
of the “five Maitreya texts” is unknown in the earliest catalog of 
Tibetan translations from Sanskrit texts, which was compiled in 824.19
” See Hakamaya Noriaki, “Some Problems Concerning the Transmission and Ap­
propriation of YogScAra Buddhism in Tibet’* (in Japanese) in Journal of Oriental 
Science, Vol. 21, No. 2 and Yoshimura Shdki, The Denkar-ma, An Oldest Catalogue 
of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons for this date as well as the observation about the 
absence of the Maitreya texts as such.
In passing, we may also note that this distinction between different 
types of omniscience is also unknown in the Ratnagotra-vibhQga, other­
wise known as the Uttara-t antra, which is another one of the texts 
ascribed by the Tibetans to Maitreya. This text has been translated into 
English twice, first by Obermiller and more recently by Takasaki. Ober- 
miller’s translation was done from the Tibetan, but in the interval the 
Sanskrit text has been published by E. H. Johnston and Z. Nakamura.
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There are many references to Buddha’s omniscience in this text as well, 
and the Sanskrit text reveals that the word used in this context is sarva- 
jna. We shall cite one example, RGV 11.42: “The Omniscience [sarvtz- 
Jnatvah] of the Divine is That which is called the state of the Buddha, 
The Ultimate, Highest Nirvana, The Buddha’s inconceivable introspec­
tion.”20 21Here again omniscience is said to be functionally equivalent 
to Buddhahood, a spiritual kind of omniscience, which is not distin­
guished from the word for omniscience which was in use in the Pali 
scriptures. This is further evidence that the Tibetan ascription of 
these three texts (the AA, MSA, and RGV) to the same author is highly 
questionable. And insofar as sarvakQrajna is not found in the RGV, 
it appears that the system of the AA was unknown to its author as 
well.
20 E. E. Obermiller, trans., “The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salva­
tion” in Acta Orientalia (1931), p. 252; Takasaki Jikidd A Study on the Rat- 
nagotravibhdga (Uttaratantra), p. 326; Nakamura Zuiryu The Ratnagotravibhdga- 
MahOyOnottaratantra-^dstra, p. 167.1 quote from Obermiller here because I prefer his 
English. Takasaki’s version is: “That which is called Buddhahood Is the Omniscience 
of the Self-born, The highest Nirvana, and the inconceivable Arhatship, Which is 
realized through self-introspection.”
21 This discussion has already received the attention of several scholars, such as 
Satkari Mookerjee, “The Omniscient as the Founder of a Religion” in Nava Nalanda 
MahQvihOra Research Publication, Vol. II; E. A. Solomon, “The Problem of Omnis­
cience (sarvajflatva)” in Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. XXVI, Pans 1-2; and Kawasaki 
ShinjO “Proofs of the Existence of an Omniscient Person” (in Japanese) in 
Epistemology and Logic, Lectures in MahQyQna Buddhism, Vol. 9. My presentation of 
this material simply consists of a recapitulation of their prior work.
Omniscience in Later MahQyOna
Following Vasubandhu by a few centuries is the career of the Bud­
dhist logician Dharmakirti, whose discussion of omniscience takes 
place partly in response to criticism from non-Buddhist sources, prin­
cipally that of Kumirila, a MTmdmsaka.2' In line with the famous 
salutation to the Buddha by DignSga as “the embodiment of valid 
knowledge,” Dharmakirti’s primary concern is to establish the 
credibility of Buddha’s teachings. Thus he, like most other Buddhists, 
is not concerned with literal omniscience, but with a metaphorical or 
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spiritual type. However, first let us lay out Rumania’s arguments as 
our pUrva-paksa.
Kumarila, being a MlmOmsaka, holds that all spiritual knowledge is 
derived from the Vedas exclusively. Thus any claims for other sources 
will meet with his disapproval. He states that a belief in an omniscient 
person is a mere superstition, not founded on or provable by any 
logical means. There is no means for knowing spiritual truth other than 
the Vedas. In the case of an expert chef, we may praise him by saying 
that he is omniscient with regard to cookery, and Kumarila will not 
object. Similarly in the case of philosophical systems which classify 
reality into a set number of categories. One who has studied those 
categories may feel that he knows everything, in a general way. But it is 
impossible that anyone could know literally everything. Even a single 
body has more atoms and particles in it than can be known by one per­
son, not to speak of the entire universe. Furthermore, human sense 
organs are restricted to their particular objects. Claims of omniscience 
are as absurd as claiming that one can hear with one’s nose, or see with 
one’s ears. A person, such as our chef above, may be an expert in his 
chosen field, but this hardly implies that he knows anything at all out­
side of his specialty. There are certain limits to human ability. Through 
strenuous training, a man may be able to jump to a height of seven or 
eight feet, but no matter how much he practices, he will never be able 
to jump a mile high. Spiritual truths are simply inaccessible to human 
cognition without the assistance of the Vedas. Thus the Buddhist con­
tention that their teacher knew such truths is simply mistaken. Any om­
niscient person would necessarily know a number of repellent and 
disgusting things, which any sane person would avoid. Claims of om­
niscience are based on testimony from the individuals concerned or 
from their followers, but the mere assertion does not make it so. 
Moreover, several different teachers have claimed (or been claimed) to 
be omniscient, yet they are unable to agree among themselves. This in­
dicates that none of them are truly omniscient. Only an omniscient per­
son can verify another’s claim to be omniscient. The wise person will re­
main skeptical of all such claims. Omniscience, if it exists, is impercepti­
ble, and cannot be proved by a syllogism, because there is no logical 
sign of omniscience which could establish its existence. Inference is 
always dependent upon perception. Thus the two main types of correct 
knowledge are ruled out. Nor is there anything similar to an omniscient 
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person, so his existence cannot be proved by analogy. Even if there 
were an omniscient person, he would retain his omniscience only as 
long as he was directly cognizing everything, which presumably would 
be some kind of meditative state. Upon emerging from such a trance, 
he would lose his omniscience. Some pious Buddhists declare that 
Buddha himself did not say anything, but his teaching proceeded 
automatically based on the needs of his individual followers, but this is 
quite unbelievable. The Buddha did indeed give spiritual instructions 
to his followers, but his teaching may be wrong. Further objections are 
attributed to Sftmata and Yajfiata. Does an omniscient person know 
everything simultaneously or successively? If the former, one cognition 
would contain a multitude of contradictory qualities, which is impossi­
ble (or at least unprecedented) for human cognition. If the latter, it 
would take a very long time to know everything in the universe, during 
which such a person would most likely grow old and die. A knowledge 
of the general nature of all phenomena will not do, since it doesn’t 
qualify as a knowledge of every particular thing. Also, such a knowl­
edge could be false, and even if it were true, it would reduce particular 
diversity to an indistinguishable unity, in which there would be no 
distinctions such as teacher and pupil, right and wrong, etc. It may 
be said that the omniscient cognition is a special case, inaccessible to or­
dinary people, but this statement itself is unproven and merely begs the 
question.
The foregoing arguments are to be found in the Tattvasamgraha, a 
Buddhist work of the eighth century, which reports KumSrila’s views 
in this case fairly and accurately. However, insofar as the above asser­
tions constitute a purva-paksa, they are incomplete without their 
refutation. Dharmakirti starts, as mentioned above, by denying literal 
omniscience for the Buddha. Kumarila’s critique may have some 
force for Jainas, but not against a more limited form of omniscience. 
Claims that Buddha was omniscient mean that what he taught is 
verifiably correct, and more specifically that he is an expert when it 
comes to attaining liberation, nirvana, or enlightenment. Knowledge 
of mundane details such as the number of insects in the world or the 
number of fish in the oceans is irrelevant.22 The power of his physical vi­
22 One is reminded here of the mention by Rabelais of “Mataeotechny—the Home 
of Useless Knowledge.”
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sion is beside the point. Even if he were able to see tiny objects miles 
away, this would give no indication of his abilities as a spiritual 
teacher. And if we make far-sightedness a criterion for a good teacher, 
let us all go learn from the eagle! Buddha was a perfect teacher, in that 
he knew all the details concerning liberation. He had not only the per­
sonal experience of his own enlightenment to inform the content of his 
discourse, but also the compassion for the suffering of others to pro­
vide his motivation. In this sense, then, he is the perfect teacher, 
praised as omniscient. Liberation results from the elimination of igno­
rance, so his teaching is accepted as authoritative. In his capacity as the 
supreme teacher, Buddha must also theoretically have access to mun­
dane information as well, to be used in the context of teaching as the 
situation demands. And while it may not be possible to prove that such 
an omniscient person actually exists, it is no more possible to prove 
that such an existence is itself impossible. Dharmakirti held the tradi­
tional Buddhist opinion that consciousness is luminous by nature, and 
that the various defilements and impurities which diminish its capacity 
are not essential but adventitious. Thus when consciousness is purified 
of all defilements, its capacity for knowledge should become infinite. 
Dharmakirti’s position on this issue is recognizably similar to that of 
the Milinda-pafiha, and constitutes what has become the mainstream 
Buddhist interpretation of Buddha’s omniscience.
Santarak$ita and his commentator Kamalaslla give what is probably 
the most famous discussion of this problem23 in their Tattvasamgraha, 
as mentioned above. In addition to the previous studies by Solomon, 
Mookerjee, and others, the entire Tattvasamgraha has been translated 
into English, rendering this discussion accessible to a much wider au­
dience. Here we shall give only a few of the highlights of this fascinat­
ing discussion. In general, &&ntarak$ita says that the question of the 
existence of an omniscient person is open to doubt, and cannot be 
conclusively proven either way. Thus he criticizes the Mlmamsaka, 
saying: “If you deduce the incapacity of other persons, in regard to a 
certain effect, from your own example . . . then you land yourself in 
absurdities.” The criterion of omniscience is stated as: “One is to be 
recognised as omniscient only when he has been found to satisfy all 
23 Solomon, p. 67: “The Tattvasamgraha's treatment of the concept of sarvajna is 
the best that we find in the whole range of Indian philosophical literature.’’
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tests and all reasons, and has been found to have the true knowledge of 
all things.” This test is rather stringent, and would require omniscience 
on the part of the judge as well. Yet Sintaraksita’s main concern is 
identical to that of DharmakTrti: “What is primarily and directly 
understood by us is that there is a Person who knows the means of at­
taining Heaven and Liberation; —but not this alone; it is also believed 
that there is a Person who also knows all things.” Thus Santarak$ita 
goes beyond Dharmakirti’s position in postulating the existence of 
someone with a literal omniscience. Of course, Buddha’s status as the 
perfect teacher is the main issue, and here we find that the Buddhist doc­
trines are accepted as valid only after they have been critically ana­
lyzed. In this context the goldsmith quote occurs again. Thus Buddha’s 
doctrines are said to withstand rational criticism, and for this reason 
Buddha is hailed as omniscient. It is otherwise in the case of teachers 
whose doctrines rely on their alleged omniscience. The quality of omnis­
cience being non-perceptible (at least to non-omniscient people), its 
non-apprehension is no proof of its non-existence, it is at most an occa­
sion for doubt. Yet since Buddhist doctrines are said to be established 
by logical proofs, omniscience is not regarded as the exclusive property 
of 3akyamuni. If other teachers propound doctrines which agree with 
what has been proven before, or can withstand logical analysis, San- 
tarak$ita is willing to acknowledge their omniscience as well. Insofar as 
they understand the true nature of reality, they are Buddhas. Omnis­
cience results from the elimination of all obscurations and hindrances 
to cognition, as in Jainism. In this way omniscience is not caused as 
much as it is revealed or uncovered. Santarak$ita says that an omnis­
cient person perceives everything directly through his mind, which or­
dinarily correlates the data from the senses, operates the memory, and 
so forth. Thus his knowledge is taken to be similar to ordinary 
knowledge, only carried to its limit by the repeated practice of medita­
tion. For 3&ntarak$ita as for DharmakTrti, consciousness is luminous 
by nature, and removing obscurations reveals its luminosity and in­
creases its potential all the way to omniscience. “As a matter of fact, 
there is no limit to the knowledge of man.” In asserting that a “single 
clear appearance of all things in a single cognition is quite possible,” 
£&ntarak§ita blurs one of the major distinctions made by (or for) 
Sakyamuni in the Kannakatthala Sutta. The assertion that a “single 
cognition comprehends all that is knowable” follows the position of 
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the Mahasamghikas. In fact, Santarak$ita wants to have it both ways: 
“Whatever He wishes to know He comes to know it without fail; —such 
is His power, as He has shaken off all evil. He knows things either 
simultaneously or in succession, just as He wishes,” thus conflating the 
two kinds of omniscience which were so carefully distinguished by 
&akyamuni for King Pasenadi above.
The problem of omniscience was a perennial concern in later 
Mahayana philosophy, as evidenced in the works of JfianaSrimitra, 
Ratnakirti, and Mok$3karagupta, but their treatment of this issue adds 
very little to that of Kamala&la. Two kinds of omniscience are 
distinguished, first and more important a spiritual or figurative omnis­
cience which is equated with dharmajna, especially knowledge of the 
four truths, and only secondarily a literal kind of omniscience, which is 
much harder to prove, and receives only cursory treatment. The former 
is regarded as the natural result of developing one’s mental function 
through repeated meditation. Both Ratnakirti and Mok$akaragupta 
use the same example, that of the image of a girl which clearly appears 
to her lover based on his intense passion for her. Substituting the Bud­
dhist four truths for the girl gives us their idea of omniscience. Rat­
nakirti defines this kind of figurative omniscience as the capability of 
a mental function to become distinct, following the example of his 
teacher Jfiana£rimitra, who defines it as the knowledge of what is to be 
avoided and what is to be obtained which functions clearly in a great 
variety of situations.24 This idea is a long way from literal omniscience. 
Literal omniscience receives scant attention from Ratnakirti, although 
he does make a perfunctory effort to prove it as well. Here we will give 
Mok$£karagupta’s proof: “Words agreeing with a proof and having a 
definite object presuppose directly or indirectly the knowledge intuiting 
that object, as e.g. the words ‘fire burns’; The words ‘all produced 
things are momentary’ also agree with a proof and have definite ob­
jects; [therefore, the words presuppose the knowledge intuiting all 
24 Quoted by Ratnakirti in Biihnemann, Der Allwissende Buddha, Ein Beweis und 
seine Probleme. RatnakTrti’s Sarvajhasiddhi iibersetzt und kommentiert, p. 12. Also 
see E. Steinkellner's article in L. Lancaster, ed., PrajnQparamita and Related Systems, 
p. 387 (quoting Jfiana£rimitra): “Through the force of such training it is possible that a 
kind of mental function, which is characterized by matters to be obtained, to be avoid­
ed, and their kinds, becomes distinctly manifest as referring to the greatest number of 
totally clear (individual) life-situtations. Only this we consider as omniscience.”
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things, i.e. there must be an all-knowing person.]” This so-called 
proof is hardly convincing, and its very weakness is an indication of the 
relative unimportance it was accorded by Buddhist philosophers.
Grandiose as the conception of literal omniscience is, it is not yet the 
last word in Buddhist philosophy. In later Mahayana,25 ideas of the 
Buddha become even more fabulous, such that Buddha’s “eye, ear, 
nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses are each omniscient. 
Thus, a single moment of any consciousness cognizes all phenomena.”26 
For example, according to this idea, Buddha’s knee is able to hear, 
see, smell, taste, and feel all phenomena in the universe all the time, 
which takes the concept of omniscience about as far as it can go. By 
this time Buddha has become a god, or the god above the gods, and his 
followers, conveniently overlooking his earlier warnings, quite happily 
describe him in terms that far surpass their own experience.
25 Shading over into Tantra, although Hopkins typically gives no specific source for 
the following quote.
26 Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, p. 120.
Summary
We find that the concept of omniscience in Buddhist philosophy 
gives us a way of understanding the development of Buddhism within 
India. From examining the issues connected with this term we can 
easily discern a tendency within Buddhism to exalt the abstract at the 
expense of the concrete. To begin with, Sakyamuni was noticeably un­
comfortable with any claims for omniscience, made about either him 
or others. His concern was much more matter-of-fact, dealing with or­
dinary experience and statements that could be made on that basis 
alone. However, soon after his death, we find that statements were at­
tributed to him which begin to open the door for claims by later Bud­
dhists to be following an omniscient teacher. This is the natural out­
come of early Buddhists wishing to uphold the superiority of their own 
teacher and his doctrine in the face of rival claims to omniscience 
which were quite specific. Yet throughout the early period, at least, 
Buddha’s omniscience does not go beyond the nature of ordinary 
knowledge, although it does represent the development of such knowl­
edge to its limit. With the development of the Mahayana, the figure 
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of the human Sskyamuni is lost, replaced by a divinized and cosmic 
Buddha who is vastly superior to all other creatures. Even Buddha’s 
omniscience must become a super-omniscience to be worthy of this 
exalted being. Bridging the gap between such an abstractly conceived 
super-godlike figure and the ordinary individual is the figure of the 
bodhisattva. Yet throughout this development, Buddhist philosophers 
consistently maintain that omniscience in Buddhism is not to be 
understood literally, or that at least this is not the primary sense in 
which Buddha is said to be omniscient. Buddha is omniscient by virtue 
of his perfect knowledge of the methods and techniques for spiritual 
liberation, which find expression in his teachings. That this is to be 
distinguished from literal omniscience is also indicated by Tucci, 
Conze, Suzuki, and other translators as well, who render “sarvajfiattT 
not as “omniscience,” although this is the obvious choice, but by the 
somewhat cumbersome “All-knowledge.” This may perhaps be due 
to their desire to avoid the theological overtones of “omniscience” 
within Christian cultures.
Yet the later distinction between sarvajna and sarvakQrajna can be a 
useful one for classifying Buddhist scriptures. Without knowing pre­
cisely when the latter term was first introduced, we can nevertheless 
notice which texts make use of it and which do not. This is a task for 
another occasion, but here we can note that it has been useful to us in
criticizing the Tibetan tradition of the five Maitreya texts. Since 
sarvakOrajna is an odd term found especially in the Prajndpdramita
Sutra in 25, VAA Lines and the AbhisamayalamkQra, we can use it to
distinguish which texts are associated with them.
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